Business operations in transition countries are subject to numerous obstacles. This study uses enterprise-level data collected by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to analyze which potential obstacles are the greatest impediments and how …rm and/or country characteristics are related to the severity of obstacles. In addition, the data permit estimation of the impact of informal payments to government o¢ cials in reducing reported impediments. Based on the econometric …ndings policy recommendations for reducing obstacles are presented.
Introduction
Business operations in transition countries are subject to numerous obstacles. This study uses enterprise-level data collected by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to identify the speci…c obstacles that businesses say are their greatest impediments. For the most commonly identi…ed obstacles we analyze and how …rm and country characteristics are related to the severity of the identi…ed obstacles. In addition, the data permit exploration of the relationship between informal payments (bribes) to government o¢ cials and the impediments faced by businesses. We examine whether informal payments to government o¢ cials reduce the severity of reported obstacles, or whether obstacles force businesses to make informal payments. Based on the econometric …ndings policy recommendations for reducing impediments are presented.
BEEPS 2009 Questions Used in Analysis
The BEEPS survey includes numerous questions on business-government relations. In particular, this paper uses responses to Question J30 of BEEPS which asks …rms to indicate speci…c factors that a¤ect their current operations. The factors listed in that question are: tax rates, tax administration, business licensing and permits, political instability, corruption, and courts. Enterprises are asked whether these factors are no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a moderate obstacle, or a very severe obstacle. This paper analyses …rm responses to this and other questions, with an emphasis on determining how …rm and country characteristics may a¤ect their business environment and their experience in dealing with government o¢ cials. Numerous …rm characteristics are available in the BEEPS data, including the industry sector in which the …rm operates, the number of employees, the legal structure of the …rm, the experience of the …rm manager, and the competitive context in which the …rm operates. In order to control for economic conditions across countries, the BEEPS data set is augmented with country characteristics. Country-level economic data used in the study include GDP per capita (PPP 2008) , the GDP growth rate (percent), the size of the agricultural sector of the economy (percent of GDP), an indicator of whether the country is part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the value-added tax rate (percent), the total tax rate applied to corporations (percent), and the share of GDP that is produced in the private sector (percent).
After analyzing …rm responses regarding factors a¤ecting their current operations, the paper then analyzes the interaction between business impediments and informal payments to government o¢ cials. Firms reporting impediments in Question J30 are subsequently asked in Question Q39 of the BEEPS survey how often they are asked to make irregular, "additional payments or gifts" to get things done with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, etc. Using …rm responses to that question, a selection model is estimated that explains whether they make such payments, and if so explains the reported frequency.
Which is the Biggest Obstacle?
Question M1 of the BEEPS survey asks …rms which is the biggest obstacle that they face. Table 1 reports the response frequencies for the …fteen listed responses as well as an other category. The …nal column of the table lists the rank importance of each potential obstacle. Obstacles are ranked from 1 to 15, with 1 being the most frequent response and 15 being the other or omitted category.
The top obstacle is tax rates in the country, with nearly 17 percent of the 12,004 …rm respondents listing that as the biggest obstacle. Second, …rms reported access to …nance as their next biggest obstacle, with just over 15 percent of …rms selecting this obstacle. Third, political instability in the country was identi…ed as the largest obstacle by just over 10 percent of the …rms. Fourth, the practices of competitors in the informal sector was listed as the biggest obstacle by 10 percent of the …rms. Fifth, an inadequately educated workforce was indicated as the biggest obstacle by about 8 percent of the …rms. Finally, corruption was identi…ed as the major problem by about 6 percent of the …rms. Remaining obstacles each received less than 5 percent response rates. The top 6 obstacles, each garnering more than 5 percent responses, account for 66.9 percent of the total responses in the survey. Hence, these obstacles which account for two-thirds of the identi…ed biggest obstacles are the focus of the analysis in the remainder of this paper.
Models and Empirical Results

Modeling Approach
We use a standard selection model in the estimations to follow. In that model there are both respondents and non-respondents in the survey. Furthermore, there is a selection process that determines who responds, with the remainder being non-respondents. We are concerned with the possibility that respondents are systematically di¤erent from non-respondents and want to control for that contingency. Suppose that we have a sample selection criterion de…ned by the equation
and that the primary equation of interest
The sampling situation is that y is only observed when z is strictly positive. We also suppose that the error terms " and follow a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and correlation . In this situation, Theorem 21.4 of Greene (1990) provides the model that applies to the observations in the sample with the following properties:
where we de…ne the parameter as
and the ratio denoted ( ) is the ratio of the normal probability density function to the cumulative density function evaluated at 0 w= :
Thus, we have the expected value of y conditional on its selection given by the expression
This expression indicates that a simple regression of y on the vector of explanatory variables x would give an inconsistent set of estimates of the coe¢ cients. The problem is essentially that of an omitted variable. Regression of y on the vector of explanatory variables x must also include the term to obtain consistent estimates. If we estimate that the parameter is positive (negative) we have an indication that unobserved factors that make participation more likely tend to be associated with larger (smaller) e¤ects in the second (selection) equation. The error term in the selection equation and the primary equation are positively (negatively) correlated.
In what follows, we will use this modeling approach to explain business survey responses on obstacles and their severity as well as bribes paid to government o¢ cials. In each case we will report a probit model and a selection model explaining the dependent variable conditional on the selection criteria.
Econometric estimation of this selection model reveals the …rm and country characteristics that in ‡uence participation in making informal payments and the extent to which participation then a¤ects reported business obstacles. Based on the estimated results, policy implications are suggested that may reduce both the impediments to business operations and the frequency of informal payments to government o¢ cials.
Empirical Results
The empirical strategy involves estimating the …rst stage probit model where …rms report that a particular obstacle exits or not. Independent variables in the …rst stage include 16 characteristics of the …rm and 6 characteristics of the country in which the …rm operates. The second stage model takes into account the …rm's response on the existence or non-existence of that obstacle and estimates the severity of the reported obstacle conditional on its …rst stage response. Greene (2012) . Although the intention of doing so is to correct bias due to unobservable variation, inferences in this circumstance are not valid when the second stage regression is non-linear. On this topic see Tucker (2011) or Greene (2012) . We include the IMR in our outcome OLS model estimations but not in our ordered Probit models because those second stage regressions are non-linear. Tables 2a and 2b provide the …rst stage Probit model estimates for the top six obstacles. The dependent variable in these models is a dichotomous (0/1) variable de…ned as taking on the value one if the …rm that the given obstacle is the biggest; zero otherwise. Each of the Probit models regresses this measure of obstacle indicator on sixteen characteristics of the …rm and six characteristics of the economic situation in the country in which the …rm operates.
First Stage Probit Models for the Six Biggest Obstacles
For the most frequently reported obstacle of tax rates, the Probit model estimates indicate that seven …rm characteristics are signi…cant explanatory factors. Manufacturing …rms are more likely to identify tax rates as the biggest obstacle they face. Shareholding companies with shares traded privately are also more likely to report tax rates as the biggest obstacle, relative to …rms with publicly traded shares. In terms of …rm establishment factors, …rms that were originally private, subsidiaries of former SOEs, joint ventures with foreign partners, or SOEs, were all less likely to report tax rates as the biggest obstacle relative to the left-out category of …rms that were privatizations of state-owned …rms. The …nal …rm characteristic signi…cantly in ‡uencing (positively) the selection of tax rates as the biggest obstacle is …rm competition with informal sector …rms. Two country characteristics signi…cantly a¤ect the choice of tax rates as the biggest obstacle: GDP per capita and the total tax rate on company pro…ts. Both of these country characteristics increase the likelihood of …rms indicating tax rates are an obstacle.
The second most frequently identi…ed biggest obstacle is access to …nance. In this case there are six …rm characteristics that signi…cantly in ‡uence the likelihood that the …rm identi…es this obstacle as most important. Three of the legal status variables are negative and signi…cant (shareholding company with shared traded privately if at all, sole proprietorship, and limited partnership), indicating that …rms with these legal forms are less likely to identify access to …nance as an obstacle, relative to the left-out category of a shareholding company with shares publicly traded. The number of years that the …rm has been established has a positive e¤ect on the likelihood of the …rm identifying access to capital as its biggest obstacle. In terms of …rm establishment, those …rms that were originally private, compared to the left-out category of privatized state-owned …rms, are more likely to identify this obstacle. Also, …rms that indicate they compete with informal market …rms are more likely to identify this obstacle as their biggest. Among the country characteristics, …ve variables have signi…cant e¤ects. Firms operating in CIS countries and in countries with higher GDP growth rates are more likely to indicate assess to …nance is their biggest obstacle. Firms operating in countries with high VAT or total company pro…t tax rates or operating in countries with larger agricultural sectors are less likely to indicate access to capital is their biggest obstacle.
The third most frequently indicated biggest obstacle is political instability, for which seven …rm characteristics are signi…cant explanatory factors. Manufacturing …rms are more likely to identify this obstacle. Firms with the legal forms of sole proprietorship and "other" are less likely to indicate this obstacle is their biggest, relative to shareholding companies with shares traded in the stock market. In terms of how the …rm was established, …rms that were originally private and …rms that joint ventures with a foreign partner are more likely to identify this obstacle as their biggest. Firms with an international quality certi…cation are less likely to indicate political instability is their biggest obstacle. Firms that say they compete with informal market …rms are more likely to report political instability as their biggest obstacle. Five of the country characteristics have a signi…cant e¤ect on the likelihood that political instability is reported as the biggest obstacle. Firms in CIS countries, …rms in relatively high GDP per capita countries, and …rms in countries with high VAT rates are more likely to view political instability as their biggest obstacle. On the other hand, …rms in countries with fast GDP growth or high total taxes on company pro…ts are less likely to report this obstacle as their biggest.
Informal sector competition is the fourth highest ranked obstacle. In this case four …rm characteristics have a signi…cant e¤ect. Older …rms, established a longer period of time, are more likely to indicate that competition from …rms in the informal sector is their biggest obstacle. Two …rm establishment conditions also increase the likelihood of identifying this obstacle: private subsidiary of a former SOE and joint venture with a foreign partner. Consistent with this particular obstacle, …rms that compete with informal market …rms also indicated that this is their biggest obstacle. Among the country characteristics that are signi…cant we have …rms operating in CIS countries more likely to report this obstacle as their biggest. Firms operating in countries with higher VAT rates or lower total tax rates on company pro…ts are more likely to identify this obstacle.
Adequacy of the workforce is the …fth most frequently identi…ed biggest obstacle. In this case, six …rm characteristics signi…cantly a¤ect the choice of this obstacle. Once again, manufacturing …rms appear to be distinct and are more likely to identify this obstacle as their biggest. Among forms of legal status, only sole proprietors are di¤erent from other legal forms in being less likely to indicate adequacy of the workforce is their biggest obstacle. Firm establishment conditions matter for joint ventures with foreign partners which are more likely, and SOEs which are less likely to indicate this is an obstacle. Competition with informal market …rms and government subsidies are both signi…cant as they increase the likelihood of indicating workforce adequacy is the biggest obstacle. Among country characteristics, all six variables are signi…cant in their e¤ect on this obstacle. CIS location, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, and the total tax rate on pro…t all increase the likelihood of reporting this obstacle is the biggest. The VAT tax rate and the agricultural intensity of the economy both reduce the likelihood.
Finally, corruption is the sixth ranked biggest obstacle. In this case there are six …rm characteristics that signi…cantly a¤ect the choice of corruption as the biggest obstacle. Manufacturing …rms are more likely to indicate so, once again revealing a sectoral in ‡uence. Considering legal status of the …rm, those that are shareholding companies with privately traded shares are more likely to …nd corruption a problem and those classi…ed as "other" legal status are less likely. Older established …rms are less likely to report corruption as their biggest obstacle. In terms of …rm establishment conditions, those …rms that are in joint ventures with a foreign partner are more likely to see corruption as an obstacle. Firms facing competition from other …rms in the informal sector are also more likely to report corruption as their biggest obstacle. Among country characteristics that are signi…cant, in this case …ve of the six country characteristics are signi…cant. All of those, but the VAT rate, increase the likelihood of reporting that corruption is a problem.
Summarizing the e¤ect of …rm characteristics across all six obstacles, we observe that manufacturing …rms are more likely to report obstacles than other …rms. Firms that are in joint ventures with foreign partners are also typically more likely to report obstacles. And, …rms that indicate they compete with informal market …rms are much more likely to report all six of these top obstacles. Country characteristics all have a systematic impact, with the exception of the agricultural share of value added in the economy. CIS country location has a strong positive e¤ect across all six obstacles. GDP per capita also has a positive impact. The GDP growth rate has a positive e¤ect in three of the four obstacles where it is signi…cant. The e¤ect of the VAT rate is mixed in sign, positively a¤ecting political instability and informal market competition, but negatively a¤ecting access to …nance, workforce adequacy and corruption. The total tax rate on pro…t is signi…cant across all six obstacles, with three positive e¤ects and three negative e¤ects.
Second Stage OLS Models for the Severity of the Six Biggest Obstacles
Tables 3a and 3b provide the second stage estimates of OLS models of the severity of the biggest obstacles. The dependent variable in these models is measured on a scale from zero (no obstacle) to four (very severe obstacle). Each of the models regresses this measure of obstacle severity on sixteen characteristics of the …rm, six characteristics of the economic situation in the country in which the …rm operates, and an indicator of whether the …rm reports paying bribes to o¢ cials. In addition, an inverse Mills ratio is included in the model to control for selectivity bias.
For the most frequently reported obstacle of tax rates, the estimated model coe¢ cients indicate that six of the …rm characteristics have a signi…cant impact on the severity of the reported tax rate obstacle. Manufacturing …rms report that tax rates are a more severe obstacle than do other …rms. Legal structure of the …rm also matters as sole proprietors and limited partnerships report less severity of this obstacle in comparison to the left-out legal category of shareholding companies with shares traded in the stock market of the country. The number of years since …rm establishment has a positive e¤ect, indicating that older …rms report more severe tax rate obstacles. The number of employees has a negative and signi…cant e¤ect, indicating that larger …rms report that tax rates are a somewhat less severe obstacle. Finally, among …rm characteristics, the presence of an international quality certi…cation for the …rm has a signi…cant positive e¤ect on the reported severity of the tax rate obstacle. Among country economic conditions three factors have a signi…cant e¤ect on the severity of the tax rate obstacle. Firms operating in CIS countries report much more severity for the tax rate obstacle, compared to …rms operating in other countries. The total tax rate that applies to company pro…ts also has a signi…cant positive impact on the reported severity of the tax rate obstacle. Firms operating in countries whose economies are more agriculturally oriented report that the tax rate obstacle is less severe in comparison to other …rms. The dichotomous variable for …rm reported irregular payments to government o¢ cials is positive and signi…cant. This result indicates that …rms who admit to making informal payments (or bribes) report that the tax rate obstacle is more severe. The inverse Mills ratio is not signi…cant indicating that there is no particular selection bias in this case.
The second highest ranked obstacle is access to …nance and the second stage OLS model in this case indicates that three …rm characteristics have signi…cant e¤ects. Manufacturing …rms report more severe access to …nance obstacles than do other …rms. Firms with the "other" legal structure, in comparison to shareholding companies with shares traded in the stock market of the country, report that tax rates are a less severe obstacle. Firm size also matters, with larger …rms employing more workers reporting a less severe …nance access obstacle. In this model none of the country speci…c economic characteristics are signi…cant. The informal payments to o¢ cials variable is positive and signi…cant, indicating that …rms paying bribes report more severe …nance access obstacles. The inverse Mills ratio is not signi…cant in this case, indicating no selection bias.
Political instability, the third-ranked obstacle, has reported severity that is signi…cantly a¤ected by six …rm characteristics. The severity of this obstacle increases with sole proprietorship legal form, "other" …rm establishment history, and international quality certi…cation. Severity decreases with joint venture status with a foreign partner, and state owned enterprises. Among country economic characteristics, GDP per capita and the agricultural share of value added both reduce reported severity of this obstacle. The irregular payments variable is positive and signi…cant, indicating that …rms paying bribes report that political instability is a more severe obstacle. In this case the inverse Mills ratio is negative and signi…cant indicating the presence of selection bias. Unobserved factors in the …rst stage (participation) equation are associated with smaller e¤ects in the second stage (severity) equation. Firms reporting political instability as the biggest obstacle tend to report a smaller degree of the severity of the obstacle.
For the fourth-ranked obstacle, competition with informal market …rms, there are three …rm characteristics that have a signi…cant e¤ect. State-owned enterprises are less likely to report this as their biggest obstacle while "other" established …rms are more likely to do so. Firms receiving a government subsidy are less likely to indicate this obstacle. Among country characteristics only the total tax rate on company pro…ts is signi…cant, with a negative e¤ect. Interestingly, this is the only case where the indicator variable for informal payments to government o¢ cials is not signi…cant. Also, the inverse Mills ratio is insigni…cant in this case.
Workforce inadequacy is the …fth-ranked obstacle. In this case seven …rm characteristics are signi…cant in explaining the reported severity of the obstacle. Sole proprietorships reported less severity of this obstacle, relative to the leftout legal category of shareholding companies with shares traded in the stock market of the country Years since the …rm was established has a positive e¤ect, with older …rms reporting a more severe obstacle related to adequacy of the workforce. Regarding the conditions under which the …rm was established, originally private …rms, private subsidiaries of former SOEs, and …rms that are in joint ventures with foreign partners all reported greater severity of this obstacle. Larger …rms and …rms that face competition from the informal sector also reported greater severity of this obstacle. All six of the country economic characteristics have signi…cant e¤ects as well. CIS location, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, and the total tax rate on company pro…t all increase the reported severity of this obstacle. The VAT rate and the agricultural share of the economy's value added both reduce the reported severity. Firms that make informal payments to government o¢ cials report a greater severity of this obstacle. Finally, the inverse Mills ratio is positive and signi…cant indicating the presence of selection bias.
The sixth-ranked obstacle is corruption, for which eleven of the …rm characteristics are signi…cant explanatory variables. The reported severity of corruption as an obstacle is greater for …rms that are of the "other" legal form, are longer established, are of the "other" establishment type, and have international quality certi…cation. The remaining signi…cant …rm characteristics all reduce the reported severity of the corruption obstacle: manufacturing sector, shareholding companies with shares traded privately, sole proprietorships, partnerships, joint ventures with foreign partners, …rm size, and competition with informal market …rms. Firms that make informal payments to government o¢ -cials report a greater degree of severity of corruption as an obstacle. The inverse Mills ratio is negative and signi…cant indicating the presence of selection bias. Once again, unobserved factors in the …rst stage (participation) equation are associated with smaller e¤ects in the second stage (severity) equation. Firms reporting corruption as the biggest obstacle tend to report a smaller degree of the severity of the obstacle.
Second Stage Ordered Probit Models of the Severity of the Six Biggest Obstacles
Tables 4a and 4b provide ordered probit estimates of second stage models for each obstacle. The dependent variable in these models is once again measured on a scale from zero (no obstacle) to four (very severe obstacle). Each of the models regresses this measure of obstacle severity on sixteen characteristics of the …rm, six characteristics of the economic situation in the country in which the …rm operates, and an indicator of whether the …rm reports paying bribes to o¢ cials. In addition, the latent variables estimated as part of the ordered probit procedure are also reported. In this case, the Inverse Mills Ratio is not included, as recommended by Tucker (2010) and Greene (2012) . Latent variable values are estimated simultaneously with the coe¢ cients of each model. Three latent variable estimates and their signi…cance are reported corresponding to the threshholds between the four possible values taken on by the dependent variable.
For the tax rates obstacle ten of the …rm characteristics have a signi…cant e¤ect on the reported severity of this obstacle. Manufacturing …rms report a more serious problem with this obstacle than do other …rms. In terms of …rm legal structure, both sole proprietors and limited partnerships report a less serious degree of tax rates obstacle relative to the left-out legal category of shareholding companies with shares traded in the stock market of the country. Older …rms report a more severe degree of tax rates obstacle. Firms that were originally private or are privatized former SOEs also report a more serious degree of obstacle. Larger …rms apparently experience a reduced degree of obstacle seriousness as that variable has a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient. An international quality certi…cation results in the …rm having a more serious problem with taxes. Firms that compete with other …rms operating in the informal sector also experience a more serious problem with taxes. Finally, …rms that are subsidized by the government report a more serious problem with taxes. Among country-speci…c characteristics that have a signi…cant e¤ect on the tax obstacle, once again CIS location has a positive e¤ect causing a more serious tax obstacle. The country's GDP growth rate has a negative e¤ect on the tax obstacle. The total tax rate on company pro…ts also has a signi…cant positive impact on the reported severity of the tax obstacle Firms operating in more agriculturally oriented countries report a reduced level of seriousness for the tax obstacle. Finally, …rms that indicate they make informal payments to government o¢ cials indicate that the tax obstacle is more severe.
Access to …nance is the second most frequently reported biggest obstacle and in this case there are four …rm characteristics that have a signi…cant e¤ect. Manufacturing …rms report a more severe problem with access to …nance than do other …rms. Firms with legal organization "other" report less of a problem with access to …nance. Firms with an international quality certi…cation report a more severe problem with access to …nance. Competition with informal market …rms also has a signi…cant positive e¤ect on the reported severity of access to …nance as an obstacle. Among country characteristics that matter, CIS location has a positive e¤ect while both the VAT rate and the agricultural valued added of the country's economy have negative e¤ects. Firms reporting that they make irregular payments to government o¢ cials also report that access to …nance is a more severe obstacle.
The political stability obstacle has three …rm characteristics with signi…cant e¤ects. Manufacturing …rms, originally private …rms, and …rms that compete with informal market …rms all report that political stability is a more severe obstacle. Firms operating in CIS countries once again report a more severe obstacle. GDP per capita and the GDP growth rate both have a negative impact on …rm's reported severity of political stability as their biggest obstacle. Finally, …rms reporting that they make irregular payments to government o¢ cials also report that political stability is a more severe problem.
Firms reporting that competition with informal …rms is their biggest obstacle are characterized by three …rm-speci…c characteristics that appear to matter. Firms reporting the "other" category of establishment and …rms that compete with informal market …rms report this obstacle as more severe than do other …rms Firms that are subsidized by the government indicate that the severity of the obstacle is less. Country characteristics that matter include CIS location, which again increases the reported severity of this obstacle. In addition, the GDP growth rate and the total tax on company pro…ts both reduce the reported severity of this obstacle.
Inadequately trained workforce is the …fth most frequently reported biggest obstacle. In this case the …rm characteristics that have a signi…cant e¤ect include manufacturing …rms and limited partnerships, both of which report a lower degree of severity for this obstacle. Older …rms, privatized SOEs and …rms with competitors in the informal sector all report a more severe degree for this obstacle Country characteristics that matter include CIS countries and the total tax rate on company pro…ts, both of which have a positive e¤ect, and the VAT rate which has a negative e¤ect on the reported severity of this obstacle.
Again, …rms reporting that they make informal payments also report a higher degree of severity for this obstacle.
Finally, the sixth most frequently identi…ed biggest obstacle is corruption and in this case seven …rm characteristics have a signi…cant e¤ect on the reported severity of this obstacle. Shareholding …rms with shares traded privately, sole proprietorships, and …rms with "other" legal status report a reduced degree of severity for the corruption obstacle. Firms that have been private since original establishment, or report the "other" type of establishment have a more severe problem with corruption. Larger …rms report a more severe problem with corruption as well. And, consistent with many previous …ndings, …rms that compete with informal market …rms also report a more severe problem with corruption. Firms operating in CIS countries report a more severe problem with corruption A country's GDP growth rate reduces the reported degree of severity for the corruption obstacle. A higher VAT rate also reduces the reported severity. Finally, …rms that make informal payments to government o¢ cials also report a more severe obstacle posed by corruption.
Determinants of Irregular Payments to Government O¢ cials
The results reported above indicate that …rms which report making irregular payments to government o¢ cials consistently also report that the severity of the obstacles they face are more severe. Five out of the six obstacle regressions have positive and signi…cant coe¢ cients on the informal payment variable. The sole exception is the competition from informal …rms obstacle. In order to examine what factors in ‡uence a …rm's willingness to make irregular payments, we estimated probit models for each obstacle. Explanatory variables include (a) measures of the severity of the obstacle, (b) …rm characteristics, and (c) country characteristics.
Tables 5a and 5b report model estimations. In general, as …rms judge the severity of the obstacle more severe, the likelihood of making an informal payment rises. This is true across all six obstacles, with monotonic patterns of increasing coe¢ cients on the obstacle severity variables The only exceptions to this pattern are found in three cases where the coe¢ cient on the very severe obstacle variable is slightly smaller than that on the major obstacle variable. Given the standard errors, however, there is no statistical di¤erence. Hence, the results indicate that the more severe the obstacle the more likely a …rm is to make an irregular payment. Firm and country characteristics used as controls in these models have patterns of signs and signi…cance that are largely consistent with those of earlier models. Firm characteristics that a¤ect irregular payments appear to be idiosyncratic with few variables having consistent signs and signi…cance across obstacles. Among country characteristics that are consistently signi…cant across obstacles, CIS country location has a strong positive e¤ect on …rms making irregular payments. Additionally, the GDP growth rate (posi-tive), VAT rate (negative), total tax rate on pro…ts (positive) and agricultural value added (negative) are consistently signi…cant.
These results indicate that irregular payments to government o¢ cials are likely to be the result of severe obstacles to doing business in transition countries. Our earlier results where making irregular payments was an explanatory variable in models of the severity of obstacles indicated that irregular payments do not reduce the severity of obstacles. Rather, the results of these models of the determinants of irregular payments indicates that it is the severity of obstacles that creates the environment in which …rms make irregular payments.
Summary and Conclusions
This study has used World Bank enterprise-level data to identify speci…c obstacles that businesses in transition countries report to be their greatest impediments to doing business. For the six most commonly identi…ed obstacles we have analyzed how both …rm and country characteristics are related to the severity of the identi…ed obstacles. We have also explored the relationship between informal payments (bribes) to government o¢ cials and the obstacles identi…ed by businesses, examining whether informal payments to government o¢ cials reduce reported impediments, or whether impediments force businesses to make informal payments.
The top obstacle is tax rates in the country, with nearly 17 percent of the 12,004 …rm respondents listing that as the biggest obstacle. Second, …rms reported access to …nance as their next biggest obstacle, with just over 15 percent of …rms selecting this obstacle. Third, political instability in the country was identi…ed as the largest obstacle by just over 10 percent of the …rms. Fourth, the practices of competitors in the informal sector was listed as the biggest obstacle by 10 percent of the …rms. Fifth, an inadequately educated workforce was indicated as the biggest obstacle by about 8 percent of the …rms. Finally, corruption was identi…ed as the major problem by about 6 percent of the …rms. Remaining obstacles each received less than 5 percent response rates. The top 6 obstacles, each garnering more than 5 percent responses, account for 66.9 percent of the total responses in the survey. These top obstacles account for two-thirds of the identi…ed biggest obstacles and were the focus of the later analysis in the paper.
Summarizing the e¤ect of …rm characteristics across all six obstacles in the …rst stage Probit models, we …nd that manufacturing …rms are more likely to report obstacles than other …rms. Firms that are in joint ventures with foreign partners are also typically more likely to report obstacles. And, …rms that indicate they compete with informal market …rms are much more likely to report all six of these top obstacles. Country characteristics all have a systematic impact, with the exception of the agricultural share of value added in the economy. CIS country location has a strong positive e¤ect across all six obstacles. GDP per capita also has a positive impact. The GDP growth rate has a positive e¤ect in three of the four obstacles where it is signi…cant. The e¤ect of the VAT rate is mixed in sign, positively a¤ecting political instability and informal market competition, but negatively a¤ecting access to …nance, workforce adequacy and corruption. The total tax rate on pro…t is signi…cant across all six obstacles, with three positive e¤ects and three negative e¤ects.
Second stage results for OLS models of the reported severity of obstacles reveal a strong positive e¤ect for …rms that indicate they make informal payments to government o¢ cials. While bribes can sometimes be e¢ ciency enhancing, greasing the wheels of exchange in order to get things done, that does not appear to be the case here. In nearly every case (with only one exception) there is a strong positive e¤ect indicating that …rms that make irregular payments face more severe obstacles. Other …rm characteristics that are often signi…cant include the age of the …rm (years since establishment), which has a positive e¤ect indicating that longer established …rms face more severe obstacles than newer …rms. Larger …rms often report less severe obstacles, indicating that by their size they may not be such easy targets for bribe extraction by government o¢ cials. Firms with international quality certi…cations also often report more severe obstacles, indicating that they may be more externally focussed in selling their goods in external markets which leads to local o¢ cials targeting them facing greater internal obstacles. The one country characteristic that often has a signi…cant negative e¤ect on reported severity of obstacles is the agricultural sector's value added. This result indicates that more agriculturally oriented economies impose less severe obstacles to …rms. Ordered Probit results for second stage estimation of the severity of obstacles indicates that manufacturing …rms are usually more likely to report facing more severe obstacles. Firms that have been private since they were established are also more likely to report more severe obstacles. Competition with …rms in the informal market always causes reported obstacles to be more severe, as does location in a CIS country. Firms in countries that are faster growing, indicated by larger GDP growth rates, report more severe obstacles. Higher country VAT rates reduce the severity of reported obstacles in half of the six cases. Finally, …rms that indicate they make irregular payments also report more severe obstacles in all but one case.
In order to examine what factors in ‡uence a …rm's willingness to make irregular payments, we estimated probit models for each obstacle. Our results indicate that in general, as …rms judge the severity of the obstacle more severe, the likelihood of making informal payments rises. This is true across all six obstacles, with monotonic patterns of increasing coe¢ cients on the obstacle severity variables These results indicate that the more severe the obstacle the more likely a …rm is to make an irregular payment. Firm and country characteristics used as controls in these models have patterns of signs and signi…cance that are largely consistent with those of earlier models. Firm characteristics that a¤ect irregular payments appear to be idiosyncratic with few variables having consistent signs and signi…cance across obstacles. Among country characteristics that are consistently signi…cant across obstacles, CIS country location has a strong positive e¤ect on …rms making irregular payments. Additionally, the GDP growth rate (positive), VAT rate (negative), total tax rate on pro…ts (positive) and agricultural value added (negative) are consistently signi…cant.
Policy recommendations follow from these …ndings. First, the identi…ca-tion of the most severe obstacles provides direction to policymakers as they seek to eliminate barriers to economic development in their countries. Attention should be paid to tax rates, access to …nance, political stability, informal …rms, workforce training, and corruption. These are the most severe obstacles …rms report facing. Of course, these obstacles are often related to one another. For example, high tax rates may drive …rms into the informal sector causing a greater obstacle for formal …rms. Hence, policymakers should not think of each obstacle independently, but consider how the policy environment as a whole can be improved to reduce several obstacles simultaneously. Second, the severity of each of these obstacles depends on both …rm and country characteristics. While policymakers cannot directly change …rm characteristics, they can be aware of the di¤erential impact of obstacles across types of …rms and then design policies to mitigate this situation. If, for example, manufacturing …rms, private …rms, and …rms with more external orientation systematically face greater obstacles, then policies can be designed to diminish those obstacles particularly for …rms of those types. A clear set of implications from the evidence here also indicates that a thriving informal sector creates problems for …rms operating formally. Policymakers can work to remove a range of impediments faced by …rms attempting to operate successfully in the formal sector. Finally, this evidence indicates that obstacles to business activity create an environment in which …rms make irregular payments or bribes to government o¢ cials. Governments wishing to reduce bribery and corruption should focus on reducing the most onerous obstacles. 
